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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS &
CHEMICALS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff'Appellant,
vs.

I Case No.

I
ARTHUR G. McKEE & COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

13858

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant, Great
Salt Lake Minerals and Chemicals Corporation ("GSL")
against the defendant-respondent, Arthur G. McKee &
Company ("McKee"), for damages in the amount of
$300,000.00 on the grounds that the defendant was negligent or breached a contractual obligation to the plaintiff
in that it failed "to take appropriate action upon the
failure of Houben [a vendor] to supply a performance
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bond, including failure to give timely notice that the bond
had not been obtained" (R. 4). Houben by a purchase
order was to design, fabricate and field erect a conveyer
system for process plants that GSL was constructing.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court without a jury. The
court made findings and facts, conclusions of law and
entered judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing
the plaintiff's action on the merits with prejudice (R. 96).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-respondent, McKee, seeks an affirmation of the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment entered in its favor.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 9, 1969, the defendant, McKee, executed
a letter of intent with the plaintiff, GSL, under which
McKee was to perform certain engineering and procurement services relative to the construction by GSL of a
plant to extract minerals from the brines of the Great
Salt Lake (Ex. 4-P). Although the letter of intent contemplated the execution of a formal engineering contract
between the parties, this contract was never executed (Tr.
27,139).
The letter of intent provided for close cooperation
of the parties and contemplated that there would be close
consultation on every material decision. These arrange-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
ments were in fact implemented and key personnel of
GSL were in fact stationed in MeKee's offices in San
Fimtcisco from late March, 1969, until early December,
1969. These GSL personnel included Wolfgang Brinkraann, Project Manager; Fay Demcott, Purchasing
Agent; and others (Tr. 44, 45).
As the project progressed, GSL assumed a greater
and greater paiticipation in the work originally assigned
to McKee. Portions of the engineering and design work
were taken from McKee and assumed by GSL or given
to other companies (Tr. 139, 141).
On August 20,1969, Fay Demcott, GSL's Purchasing
Agent, as an economy measure by GSL and at the request
of GSL, was assigned the responsibility of performing the
expediting functions on the project (Exs. 23-D, 19-D, Tr.
38, 54-56). An expediter is a person who follows up and
makes sure that all of the documents and requirements
of a purchase order, including performance bonds, are
supplied by a vendor or subcontractor (Tr. 29, 116-17,
174).
On August 21,1969, McKee, as agent for GSL, issued
a letter of intent to Houben Industries, Inc. ("Houben")
for the complete design, supply of materials, fabrication
and field erection of a conveyor system for the GSL plant
(Ex. 9-P). Houben proceeded immediately with the engineering and design of the conveyor system (Tr. 215-16).
On September 18, 1969, McKee, as agent for GSL,
issued a purchase order to Houben covering the complete
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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design, supply of materials, fabrication and field enaction
of the conveyor system as indicated in the prior letter of
intent (Ex. 11-P). One of the terms of this purchase
order was as follows:
PERFORMANCE BOND: Vendor (Houben)
to obtain Performance Bond in the amout of
$300,000 and to furnish Purchaser 3 copies of
bond without delay. Cost of bond for Owner's
account, $3,000.00 (Ex. 11-P, p. 5).
This team obligated Houben to secure and purchase a
performance bond in the amount of $300,000, but the
cost of the bond of $3,000 was to be borne by GSL (Tr.
216). Houben never procured the performance bond as
required by the purchase order (Tr. 22).
Under the purchase order, as amended, Houben had
the right to send GSL monthly progress billings (Tr. 216).
Inasmuch as the cost of the bond was to be paid for by
GSL, Houben had the right to bill GSL for the bond once
it was obtained (Tr. 216). Shortly after November 4,
1969, Brinkman received Houben's first monthly progress
billing for $27,000 (Ex. 42-D). This first monthly progress billing was only for design and engineering labor
(Ex. 41-D). It did not include the cost of the bond (Tr.
216-18). None of the subsequent monthly progress billings
of Houben, which GSL received, contained any charge or
bill for the cost of the bond (Tr. 216-17, Exs. 42-D, 43-D,
44-D, 45-D).
Sometime prior to October, 1969, on three construction projects in San Francisco and Los Angeles, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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United Bonding Company had executed three performance
bonds on behalf of Houben (Tr. 156). These construction
projects were for the City of San Francisco and the Pdrt
of Los Angeles (Tr. 157). Prior to October 17, 1969,
Houben had failed to pay certain of its subrontractoirs
on these projects and they had filed "stop notices"
with the City of San Francisco and the Port of Los
Angeles so that funds due Houben would be paid
directly to the subcontractors (Tr. 157). The United
Bonding Company investigated this matter and detemuned that based on the estimated cost of completion and the funds to be paid to Houben from the projects, that there would be a loss in the approximate
amount of $125,000 (Tr. 158, Ex. 39-D). The United
Bonding Company set up a reserve of $125,000 and demanded that Houben and its principals, pursuant to an
indemnity agreement, produce funds to cover the estimated loss of $125,000 (Tr. 158-59). This demand was
ignored, and Parker, on behalf of the United Bonding
Company, on November 12, 1969, filed suit on the indemnity agreement against Houben and its principals and
attached their bank accounts and other properties (Tr.
159, Ex. 31-D).
On November 13, 1969, Parker met with Houben
and its attorneys, at which time Houben agreed to assign
the proceeds from four other jobs to United Bonding to
cover the projected $125,000 loss (Tr. 160-61, Ex. 34-D).
Houben gave Parker the name, address and phone number
of the corporation and the person to be contacted concerning the assignments (Tr. 161, Ex. 34-D). This list
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included: "Great Salt Lake Minerals, P. 0. Box 1190,
Ogden, Utah 801-399-5681, Mr. Wolfgang Brinkmann,
$27,492.30" (Ex. 34-D).
On November 14, 1969, Parker called GSL and asked
for Brinkmann. He spoke to someone with a German
accent; he believes it was Brinkmann (Tr. 162, 171).
Parker identified himself as the attorney for United Bonding. He stated his purpose was to determine whether on
assignment would be honored by GSL, the amount of
the receivable and the date due from GSL to Houben (Tr.
162).
Brinkmann asked Derricott to determine whether an
assignment could be made under the terms of the Houben
purchase order (Tr. 129). Derricott, on the same day,
within an hour or two, reviewed the Houben purchase
order and advised Brinkmann that under the terms of the
purchase order,.an assignment could not be made without
the prior written approval of McKee (Tr. 129).
On November 14, 1969, the same day as Ptak&r's
phone call to GSL, Parker was telephoned by GSL, apparently by Brinkmann, and was advised that GSL would
not assign the contract proceeds (Tr. 163, 171, Ex. 20-D).
Parker advised Houben that GSL would not honor
the written assignment. As an alternative Houben agreed
to request GSL to send the contract proceeds to Parker's
law office and that upon the receipt of the chesck, Houben
would then endorse the proceeds over to United Bonding
(Tr. 163-64).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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On November 17, 1969, Hoben by letter requested
Brinkrnann, of GSL, to send the payment covering the
first monthly progress billing of $27,000 to the law firm
of Hermann, Button and Parker (Ex. 29-D, 35-D). Brinkrnann sent Houben's request to Gordon Christensen,
GSL's secretary and treasurer (Ex. 40-D). Christensen
and Brinkrnann discussed whether or not the check should
be sent to the law firm (Tr. 204-6, 221-22). Christensen
advised Brinkrnann that such a request might indicate
that Houben was in financial difficulty (Tr. 207). Brinkrnann and Christensen made no further inquiry nor did
they advise or consult with anyone from McKee concerning Parker's original request for approval of an assignment or Houben's request to send the proceeds to the
law firm (Tr. 208, 223). On December 1, 1969, GSL
issued and mailed its check in the amount of $27,000 to
Houben Industries, c/o Hermann, Button and Parker
(Ex. 36-D).
On November 18, 1969, four days after the conversation with Parker, Brinkrnann sent an interoffice lettergram to Derricott requesting: "Would you please initiate that we ask Houben for bonding their design, their
manufacturing, including subcontractors for structural
steel, and their erection . . ." (Ex. 22-D). Derricott sent
Brinkmann's lettergram of November 18,1969 (Ex. 22-D)
to Kenneth Ferguson (Tr. 120, 227). On November 20,
1969, Ferguson contacted Houben about the bond and
was advised by Niepelt of Houben that the matter was
in hand and that the bond would be forthcoming shortly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Tr. 177, R. 21). Thereafter, Ferguson believes he reported this information back to Derricott (Tr. 178).
GSL allowed Houben to continue with the project
and paid Houben's monthly progress billings. GSL paid
Houben a total of $163,299.20 (Exs. 42-D, 43-D, 44-D and
45-D).
In December, 1969, the engineering and design phase
of the project was almost complete and GSL was moving into the construction phase. GSL, on December 19,
1969, terminated, effective January 2, 1970, the remaining
engineering services which McKee was then performing
(Ex. 13-P).
On May 13, 1970, Houben, by letter, advised GSL
that "due to the financial conditions of Houben" it could
not complete the conveyor system (Ex. 14-P). Thereafter GSL secured the services of Jelco Construction Company to finish the conveyor system (Tr. 23, 24). The
conveyor project was completed by Jelco at a cost in
excess of the agreed purchase price with Houben (Tr. 24).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The basic issue raised by this appeal is whether or
not the findings of fact entecred by the trial judge are
supported by the evidence. The standard of review of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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findings of fact has been frequently restated by this
court.
In the case of Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co.,
282 P. 2d 335, 3 Utah 2d 247 (1955), this court at page
250 stated:
When the Court has made findings and entered
judgment thereon as was done here, it is then
our duty to review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings, and they must be allowed to sitand if reasonable minds could agree
with them. Likewise, every reasonable intendment ought to be indulged in favor of the validity and correctness of the judgment under review
and it will not be disturbed unless the appellant
meets his burden of affirmatively showing error.
In the case of Rummell v. Bailey, 320 P. 2d 653, 7
Utah 2d 137 (1958), this court stated at page 144:
The rule of review of issues of fact is that all of
the evidence and every inference and intendment
fairly arising therefrom should be taken in the
light most favorable to the finding made by the
trial court. And if when so viewed there is a substantial support in the evidence for the finding
made, it will not be disturbed.
Although the plaintiff, in its brief, states that it
assumes "the burden of showing error in respect to material questions of fact in that (1) the facts as found are
without sufficient evidentiary support in the record," (Appellant's Brief, page 36) the plaintiff does not apply
this standard to the evidence introduced at the trial. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiff merely re-argues to this court the same evidence
which it contended at the trial supported its contentions.
The plaintiff in its brief simply ignores most of the evidence which supports the findings of fact and makes no
mention or reference to the reasonable inferences which
can be drawn from the direct evidence which also support
the findings of fact.
The findings of fact which are challenged in the
plaintiff's brief and the evidence in support of said findings will be individually discussed hereafter.
A. THERE WAS S U B S T A N T I A L EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF
FACT NO. 6.
Finding of Fact No. 6 states:
6. On August 20,1969, GSL took over and thereafter assumed the expediting functions of the
project, including the expediting of the Houben
letter of intent and the contemplated Houben
purchase order. The expediting duties assumed
by GSL as of August 20, 1969, including any
duty or obligation to inquire of Houben as to
the status of the performance bond, to see that
the bond was procured, to inquire of Houben or
others as to Houben's ability to provide said performance bond, or to advise GSL of these matters (R. 89).
The evidence indicates that on August 20, 1969, a
meeting was held between Brinkmann and Derricott of
GSL, and Milhan and Ferguson of McKee relative to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the expediting for the project. The minutes of that meeting state in part:
F. Derricott will perform the expediting, which
is indicated in the minutes of weekly meetings
and as supplemented by other communications
from McKee Engineering. Minutes of McKee
meeting of August 8 will be used to facilitate
immediate expediting activity.
McKee Material Control documents and Purchase order supplements are additional sources
for deterinination of status of information required.
McKee will arrange that F. Derricott receives
Material Control documents pertinent to the expediting function, GSL already has complete
purchase order records (Ex. 23-D).
On August 21,1969, the day after it was decided that
Derricott was to do the expediting for the project, the
Houben letter of intent for the construction of the con
veyor system was issued (Ex. 9-P). About one month
later, on September 18, 1969, the Houben purchase order
was issued (Ex. 11-P).
In Brinkmann's Monthly Engineering Report to Andrews, president of GSL, for the month of September,
1969, the following statement was made:
The expediting is now being done completely
under GSL responsibility and has improved, so
that detail design on certified vendor drawings
could continue with more effort (Ex. 19-D).
(Emphasis added.)
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Andrews, president of GSL, testified that Brinkmann
had authority to make agreements with McKee relative
to the expediting functions on the project and that according to Brinkmann's Monthly Engineering Report
for September, 1969 (Ex. 19-D), GSL had assumed the
responsibility for the expediting functions (Tr. 36-38).
Andrews testified further that an expediter is "to follow
up and make sure there are no slips on the vendor's side
and obtaining whatever it is we are looking for within
a scheduled period" and that an expediter uses the purchase order as a guide for what a vendor should produce
(Tr. 29).
Derricott, the purchasing agent of GSL and the person designated as the expediter, admitted that "the function of an expediter is to review the Purchase Order and
find out what documents are required from the vendor,
and to follow up and make sure that these documents
are submitted by the vendor" (Tr. 116-17). Derricott
admitted that he understood that the Houben purchase
order required Houben to provide a performance bond
(Tr. 116-17).
Ferguson, the purchasing agent of McKee, testified
that it was his understanding that "there would be no
[McKee] expediter on the project, that Great Salt Lake
Minerals was sending its own purchasing agent in, and
he would serve in that function" and that an expediter
"follows through on all of the requirements of the Purchase Oder" (Tr. 174).
The plaintiff, GSL, admits that on August 20, 1969,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Dwiioott assumed certain expediting duties, but at trial
and now on appeal, it argues that "the expediting duties
assumed by Derrioott did not include expediting the receipt of the performance bond from Houben, although
it was expressly required by the HOUIXT purchase order.
i\mii\ir\ to tiie uonteiiuons ni thi plaintiff at trial,
the trial co in found that GSL on August 20, 1969, prior
to the Houoen letter of intent and purchase order, assinned the expediting functions on the project, which included expediting the performance hwnd. Thi,-. Ending
i$ clearly supporvd b\ -ubsi.;uili^l m-ii.!«*nct ^ -H *'»"'th
above.
B, TTIERE WAS S U B S T A N T I A L EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF
FACT NO «
Finding of Fact No. 8 states:
8. From and at all times after August 21, 1969,
the date of the issuance of the letter of intent
to Houben, GSL, through its authorized agents,
Fay Derricott and Wolfgang Brinkmann, knew
that Houben had not obtained the performance
bond, but notwithstanding this knowledge, GSL,
by said authorized agents, allowed Houben to
continue its work on the conveyor project under the terms of the purchase order and approved
and paid Houben's monthly progress billings (R.
90).
Qrinkmann testified that the Houben .letter of intent did
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not require a bond, but only requested information about
a possible bond and that Houben started engineering and
design work on the basis of the letter of intent and prior
to the actual issuance of the purchase order (Tr. 215-15).
Brmkmann understood that Houben would bill GSL $3,000.00 for the cost of the bond and it had the right to
send GSL monthly progress billings (Tr. 215-15). Brinkmann admitted that GSL never received a bill from
Houben for the performance bond (Tr. 215-15).
When the first monthly progress billing was received,
Brinkmann requested from Houben back-up data to substantiate the billing. Houben supplied Brinkmann with
a breakdown of the charges covered by the first monthly
progress billing (Ex. 41-D). Brinkmann testified that
he had examined the breakdown of charges and knew
that it was only for design and engineering labor (Tr.
218).
The second, third and fourth monthly progress billings which GSL received contained no charge by Houben
for the performance bond (Exs. 43-D, 44-D and 45-D).
GSL paid Houben on the four monthly progress billings
the total sum of U&28Q-20.1
On November 14,1969, Lawrence Parker^ an attorney
for United Bonding Company, which had bonded Houben
on other construction projects in California, called Brink1
In answers to interrogatories, GSL admitted that before it paid the
fourth monthly progress billing of $105,565.37 on April 20, 1970, it had
been specifically advised by Houben that there was no performance
bond. (R. 56-57)
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maun, and .requested that GSL honor an assignment of
the first monthly progress payment (T>- K£M>3> After
GSL refused to honor a written assignment, Houben requested GSL by letter to send the payment for the first
monthly progress billing to Parker's law firm F!xs ?9~D
35-D).
Bnmtniunn rii^'d^ou w ill; uonwi* v,iiribtensen,
GSL's secretary and treasurer, whether or not GSL should
comply will Houben V request (Tr. 204-6) ("hristensen
advised Brmkinaiin thai Houben's request might indicate
that it was having financial problems:
Q.

Wha:

i jui. ^ J . . * . ^

,j> .

*;,

ui'hK'r.M,,,,

,-

whether or not this letti.-i -mi u \om J N USsions with Mr. Brinkmann, whether or not it was
also discussed that Houben might be having financial problems because of the request to send
monies to a law firm?
A

Y<» .<fi>

Ijerricott testified tliat he had nevei u-a-i»tw a mjn
of the performance bond and had never been advised by
.vwrtie that a bund had been provided by Houben (Tr.
119- ' • -.- -11 testified further:
Q ^ y yfLTf jfekm) Would you -turn over to
page 133. This is in response to a question asked
by Mr. Spencer starting at Line 2:
Q. Mr, DeiTicott, you have been asked for
opinions or conclusions regarding the fact
•that- no copies of the bond were .given to
GSL, is that correct?
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A. Yes (Tr. 126).
Q. (by Mr. Baker) Line 7, Mr. Derricott, w£re these questions asked and did you give these M
answers?
Q. Do you conclude from the fact no copy
of the bond had been given to GSL, that
Houben had in fact not obtained a bond?
A. I have to conclude that.
The foregoing testimony is direct and substantial
evidence that GSL, through its agents Brinkmann and
Derricott, knew from and at all times after August 21,
1969, that Houben had not procured the performance
bond. Finding of Fact No. 8 is supported by substantial
evidence.
C. THERE WAS S U B S T A N T I A L EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF
FACT NO. 9.
Finding of Fact No. 9 states:
9. Chi November 14, 1969, GSL knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known,
that Houben was in serious financial difficulty
and probably would not have been able at that
time to secure the required performance bond,
but notwithstanding this knowledge, GSL allowed
Houben to continue its work under the purchase
order on the conveyor project under the terms
of the purchase order and approved and paid
Houben's monthly progress ballings (R, 90).
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All of 'the evidence which has been previously set
forth relative to the phone communications between
Parker, the attorney for United Bonding Company and
Brinkmann, of GSL, relative to the requested approval
of an, assignment of funds to the United Bonding' Company; the request .'and transmittal of the •check by GSL
to the law firm of Hermann, Button and Parker; and the
fact that Gordon Christensen, secretary and treasurer of
GSL, specifically advised IMnkmann that Houbeo/'s request that the funds be sent to the law firm might indicate that Houben was in financial, difficulty, all support
Finding of Fact No, 9.
Park*1? aix> iu.-tiiKd UIXJUI cer
•* and law;
f
suits which had been filed a"- "
' fall of
i
1969, The case of tlatst \
luring
v. Houben hn^ it UL, w ^ iiU^i on September 15, 11)89
(Ex, 37-1 M The case of Techni-fiurfd* * ,, in, \. ( ny of
Los Angeles, United Bonding Insurance Company, Houben, et al, was filed November 12, 1969 (Ex. 38-D). Mr.
Parker also testified that after he became aware of the
stop notices on the Los Angeles and San Francisco projects, that he had a meeting on October 17, 1969 with
Houben, concerning an arrangement to cover the projected
losses (Tr, 157-58). Parker inither testified that Houben
could not have obtained a performance bond after November 1 1 969 (Tr. 1 68-69). .
Mr. Andrews testifictli
Q.
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IAJKL • ,K»
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get a performance bond, and advised you that he
represented the United Bonding Company and
requested the first progress hilling be paid to
him, this conversation and claim of the United
Bonding Company against Houben, would you
have made an inquiry at that time?
A. If you put it in those terms.
MR. SPENCER: May the record show that
was not the question presented to Mr. Brinkmann?
A. In those terms definitely (Tr. 244).
Even after Brinkmann had been advised by Christensen, GSL's secretary and treasurer, that Houben might
be in financial difficulty, he made no further inquiry into the matter (Tr. 208, 223, 228). GSL is charged with
the inforrrmikm and knowledge which such an inquiry
by a reasonable person would have disclosed.
In Universal C. L T. Corporation v. Courtesy Motors,
8 Utah 2d 275, 333 P. 2d 628 (1959), this court stated
ait page 278:
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention
and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall
be deemed conversant of it.
In Salt Lake, Garfield & W. Ry. Co. v. Allied Materials Co., 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P. 2d 883 (1955), this court
stated at page 222:
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Means of knowledge and knowledge itself are, in
legal effect, the same thing where there is enough
to put a party on inquiry. Knowledge which one
has or ought to have under the circurostances is
imputed to him.
In olhor wuid&, whatever fairly puts a person on
inquiry is sufficient notice where the means of
knowledge are at hand; and if he omiits to inquire, he is then chargeable with all the facts
which, by a proper inquiry, he might have ascertained.. A person has no right to shut his eyes
or his ears to avoid information, and then say
that he has no notice; he does wrong not to heed
the "signs and signals" seen by him. It will not
do to remain willfully ignorant of a thing readily
ascertainable . , .
Finding of Fact No. 9 that "on November 1 4, 1969,
GSL knew" or in the exercise of reasonable care' should
have known that Houben was in •serious financial difficulty and pirobably would not have been able at that
time to secure a performance bond" is clearly supported
by .the •evidence,
• D. • T H E R E W A S SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT F1N01NC OF
FACT NO. 1 1 ,
Finding of Fact No, 1 1 states:
11. On November 6 and 20, 1970, McKee contacted Houben and was advised by Houben that
it was working on procuring the bond. Shortly

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

after the receipt of this information, McKee reported said information to GSL (R. 90).
Ferguson testified that he had two conversations with
Niepelt of Houben in which he reminded Niepelt that
the bond had not been received. Niepelt told Ferguson
"that the matter was in hand and that we would be having the bond shortly" (Tr. 177). Ferguson testified further:
*

*

»

0. Did you report the subject of those conversations that you had with Mr. Niepelt to anyone
at GSL?
A. There are no contacts to that effect, but I
probably did. It would have been likely that I
would have.
Q. Did you see Mr. Demcott on a daily basis?
A. I would say generally yes. There may have
been some days we didn't see each other. We
didn't have regularly scheduled meetings, or anything like that.
Q. And your report to GSL probably would
have been to whom?
A. It would have been to Mr. Demcott, verbally
(Tr. 177-78).
The plaintiff, in its brief, complains that Ferguson's
testimony was only to the effect that he probably reported the foregoing conversations to Derricott of GSL.
Derricott at this time had an office in the McKee office
building in San Francisco, (Tr. 55) and as Ferguson testifield, they generally saw one another on a daily basis.
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The testimony relative u> the close and daily contact
between these individuals at this time and Ferguson's
testimony that he believes that he reported the conversations in question to GSL is sufficient evidence to support the court's.. Finding of Fact No, 1 1
. E. T H E R E W A S SUBSTANTIAL EVL "
DENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF
FACT NO. 12.
Finding of Fact No. 12 states;
. 12. Under the terms of the Houben purchase order, Houben was prohibited from assigning monies due under the purchase order without first
securing the written consent of McKee. On November 14, 1969, Larry Parker, an attorney representing the United Bonding Company, advised
Wolfgang Biinkmann, GSL's project manager,
that he represented the United Bonding Company which had a written assignment from Houben covering funds due Houben from GSL. Parker requested that GSL agree to the terms of the
written assignment. GSL declined to do so, but
subsequently, without advising or consulting
McKee, GSL agreed and did, in fact, send the
first monthly progress payment of $27,000 to
Larry Parker, the attorney for the United Bonding Company. These funds were used to pay
claimants of Houben construction jobs in San
Francisco and Los Angeles, California, which
were bonded by the United Bonding Company"
(R. 90-91),
Paragraph 24 of the Houben purchase order required
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the written consent of McKee before monies under the
purchase older could be assigned by Houben (Ex. 11-P).
The testimony in evidence which is referred to on pages
14 and 15 of this brief, also supports Finding of Fact No.
12. Specifically, with respect to the assignment, Parker
testified that on November 13,1969, he met with Houben.
Houben agreed to assign proceeds from certain jobs, including the GSL project (Tr. 160-61). In accordance
with that agreement, Parker, on November 14,1969, called
Brinkmann "to find out whether or not an assignment
to United Bonding would be honored," and was advised
that it would not (Tr. 162). The written assignment
was not sent to GSL because it would not accept the
assignment (Tr. 171). Subsequently, without advising
or consulting with McKee, GSL sent the first monthly
progress payment to the attorneys for United Bonding
Company (Tr. 208, 223, Ex. 36-D). There was substantial evidence in the record to support Finding of Fbct
No. 12.
F. T H E R E W A S SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDING OF
FACT NO. 13.
Finding of Fact No. 13 states:
On December 19, 1969, GSL, effective January
2, 1970, terminated the remaining engineering
and procurement services which McKee was then
performing. From January 2, 1970, until early
March, 1970* when Houben was about to begin
the erection of the conveyor system, GSL made
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no inquiry of Houben concerning the performance
bond (R. 91).
The plaintiff only complains about the first sentence
of the foregoing Finding of Fact No. 13.
Mr. Andrews testified that irrespective of the expediting duties that GSL was contending that McKee had
prior to January 2, 1970, that after this date, all of the
purchasing and expediting functions were assumed by
GSL (Tr. 33). On December 29, 1969, Ferguson wrote
Houben a letter which stated that "effective January 20,
1970, responsibility for the above project will be assumed
by Great Salt Lake Minerals'' (Ex. 13-P).
The foregoing evidence supports the first part of
Finding of Fact No. 13 to which the plaintiff complains.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO FIND THE FACTS AS REQUESTED BY
THE PLAINTIFF, GSL.
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT COMPEL
THE ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT.
The standard to be applied where a trial judge does
not make requested findings of fact in favor of a party
was stated by this court in the case of DeVas v. Noble,
13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P. 2d 290 (1962), at page 137:
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In addressing the question whether the trial
judge was obliged to make the finding demanded
by the defendants,, it is well to keep in mind certain principles applicable where it is required
that a fact be found affirmatively and the court
refuses to do so. In order to compel such a finding, it is necessary that the evidence concerning
the fact in question not only be of sufficient quality and substance to support a finding that it is
true, but it must go beyond that and be such
that all reasonable minds would so conclude. On
the other hand, if there is any reasonable basis
in the evidence, or lack of evidence, from which
reasonable minds could honestly say they were
not convinced of such facts by preponderance of
the evidence, then the ruling of the trial court
should be sustained. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court was not persuaded that the plaintiff's
evidence proved the facts as set forth in plaintiff's requested findings of fact. There is no requested finding
of fact where the evidence is so conclusive that "all reasonable minds would so conclude."
Plaintiff's requested findings of facts set forth in
Points III. A., B. and G., pages 36-37 and 40 of its brief,
relate to plaintiff's contention that McKee was obligated
to see that the performance bond was secured by Houben,
or that GSL was notified of the fact that Houben had
not procured the bond. These requested findings of fact
are merely the negative of Finding of Fact No. 6, wherein
the trial court found that GSL had assumed and taken
over these responsibilities. The defendant, in Point I, A.?
page 10 of this brief, has discussed the substantial evi-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
dence in support of Findings of Fact No. 6 which certainly indicates that all reasonable men would not conclude that the facts were as requested by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's requested finding of fact (Point III., L,
plaintiff's brief, page 41) that "McKee did not tell GSL
that the bond was delayed and did not seek instructions
of GSL when McKee learned of Houben's delay" is also
the negative of Finding of Fact No. 11 that shortly after
November 20, McKee advised GSL that Houben was
working on the bond. The evidence in support of Finding
of Fact No. 11 is set forth in Point I. D. at pages 19-20
herein.
Plaintiff also complains of the trial court's failure to
make the following findings of fact:
That had McKee acted promptly with respect
to the bonding of Houben, a bond would have
been issued and a surety company would have
been obligated to GSL, to the extent of $300,000,
for the completion of the conveyor system.
(Point III. D., plaintiff's brief, page 39.)
That McKee waited seven weeks after the purchase order to Houben was issued, at which time
Houben no longer could obtain a bond to contact Houben the first time about the bond, and
McKee waited another two weeks to telephone
Houben a second time and then waited without
taking further action with respect to the bonding of Houben. (Point III. E., plaintiff's brief,
page 40.)
Both of the foregoing requested findings of fact are
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based on plaintiff's contention that shortly after September 18, 1969, when the Houben purchase order was
issued, that Houben could, in fact, have secured the $300,000 performance bond. There is no evidence in the record which would indicate that during this period Houben
could have secured a performance bond. In fact, the evidence on this issue is all to the contrary. The plaintiff
evidently assumes that since Parker testified that in his
opinion Houben could not have procured a bond after
November 1, 1969, (Tr. 162-63) that it necessarily follows
that Houben could have secured a bond prior to that
time. Parker expressed no such opinion.
Parker testified that the case of Halsey Machine and
Manufacturing Co. v. Houben Industries, et al., was filed
on September 15, 1969 (Tr. 166, Ex. 37-D). Parker met
with Houben on October 17, 1969, roncerning the stop
notices which had been filed on the construction projects
in Los Angeles and San Francisco (Tr. 157-58). It is obvious that the stop notices were filed sometime prior to
the October 17,1969 meeting, and it is reasonable to infer
that the stop notices would not have been filed unless
Houben's obligations to the subcontractors had not been
overdue for at least a period of some weeks. The fact
that Houben did not procure any performance bond shortly after September 18, 1969 when the purchase order was
issued, is evidence in and of itself that it was unable to
secure the performance bond. All of the evidence would
indicate that by September or October, 1969, Houben

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
was in serious financial difficulty and would not have
been able to procure the bond.
The plaintiff finally contends that the court erred in
failing "to find that no benefit would have accrued to
GSL from refusing to pay Houben after November, 1969,
or in removing Houben from the job." (Part III. L., plaintiff's brief, page 42.) Under the terms of the purchase
order, Houben, for its failure to provide the performance
bond, could have been terminated and all of the amounts
due it could have been retained by GSL (Ex. 11-P, para.
20). The court in Finding of Fact No. 7 found this to be
the fact and the plaintiff has not challenged this finding
(R. 89). McNeil testified that had Houben been terminated, two other companies who had made bids originally,
Coastal Plains or Conveyor Engineering, could have been
substituted for Houben and could have completed the
job (Tr. 250).
There was no evidence in the record which, under
the standard as set forth in the Devas v. Noble case as
quoted, pages 23-24, supra, would compel the entry
of the findings of fact as requested by the plaintiff.
B. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAIILING TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AS
REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE
BY THE COURT ARE DEPOSITIVE OF
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE.
In the case of Grey v. Defa, 107 Utah 272, 153 P. 2d
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544 (1945), the defendants on appeal contended that the
trial court had erred in failing to make findings of fact
on defendants' counterclaims. The defendants, in their
counterclaims, alleged that the plaintiff had breached
certain contracts and leases. The court, at page 277,
stated:
In each instance the court found that through
failure of the individual defendants to comply
with the terms of the various agreements, they
had by the very terms of said agreements, been
terminated, and defendants had lost all rights
thereunder. * * * The agreements had terminated, and plaintiff could not thereafter breach
them. The findings made dispose of the issues,
and it was not error for the court to fail to make
a specific finding negativing every allegation of
breach in each of the defendants' counterclaims.
(Emphasis added.)
In the case of Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145
P. 2d 780 (1944), the court stated at page 368:
Where issues upon which findings are made are
necessarily decisive of the case, it is unnecessary
that the findings should dispose of any further
issues, as all other issues thereby become immaterial.
The trial court, by virtue of Finding of Fact No. 6,
found that prior to the time of the Houben letter of intent and Houben purchase order, that GSL had assumed
the expediting functions of the project which included
the duty or obligation to inquire as to the status of the
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bond, to see that the bond was procured or to inquire
of Houben as to their ability to provide the bond (R. 89).
The court also found in Finding of Fact No. 8 that subsequent to August 21, 1969, the date of the Houben
letter of intent, that GSL knew that Houben had not
obtained the performance bond, and that notwithstanding
this knowledge, it continued to allow Houben to work
on the conveyor project and to pay monthly progress
billings (R. 90).
The foregoing findings of fact are decisive of the
issues in this case. Finding of Fact No. 6 is decisive in
that McKee had no duty, obligation or responsibility relative to see that Houben procured the performance bond.
Finding of Fact No. 8 is decisive in that GSL had in its
possession the very knowledge and information which it
contends McKee had a duty to make available to it.
Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to refuse
to enter the findings of fact as requested by the plaintiff.
POINT III.

THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ENTERED
BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE CORRECT.
In order for the plaintiff, GSL, to have recovered a
judgment against the defendant, McKee, in this action,
it would have had to establish at trial (1) a duty or obligation on the part of McKee relative to the Houben
performance bond; (2) a breach by McKee of that duty
or obligation; and (3) that it sustained damages as a
proximate result of that breach. The failure of the plain-
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tiff to establish any one of the foregoing elements would,
of course, be fatal to its case and would support the judgment of no cause of action which the court, in fact, entered in this case. The trial court, on all three of the
foregoing issues, entered conclusions of law in flavor of
the defendant, McKee.
These conclusions of law are as follows:
1. The defendant, McKee, did not have a duty
or obligation, contractual or otherwise^ to inquire of Houban as to the status of the performance bond, to see that the bond was procured,
to inquire of Houben or others as to Houben's
obligation to provide said performance bond, to
timely advise GSL that Houben had not secured
the performance bond, or to take any action
upon the failure of Houben to supply the performance bond.
2. Even assuming that McKee had some duty
or obligation relative to the Houben performance bond, McKee did not breach such duty or
obligation.
3. Even assuming that the defendant, McKee,
breached any such duty or obligation, such breach
was not the proximate cause of any damage sustained by the plaintiff, GSL, inasmuch as GSL
knew at all times that Houben had not procured
the performance bond (R. 91).
The plaintiff, GSL does not attack the foregoing conclusions of law, except as it argues that the underlying
findings of fact are not based on sufficient evidence. As
has been pointed out herein, the findings of feet entered
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by the court are supported by substantial evidence and
accordingly, Conclusions of Law 1, 2 and 3 are proper
and correct. The correctness of any one of the foregoing
three conclusions of law is adequate to sustain the judgment on appeal, as would be the correctness of any other
conclusion of law relating to contributory negligence,
waiver or estoppel as discussed at pages 33 et seq., infra.
The basic rule of law in this regard has been stated
as follows:
Likewise, error in conclusions of law is no ground
for reversal . . . where other conclusions justify
the judgment . . .
Appeal and Error, 5B C. J. S., § 1789, p. 60.
In Lund v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P. 2d 215 (1937),
the plaintiff brought an action to set aside, void and
cancel certain assignments from one Ezra J. Howell to
his wife, and subject Howell's interest to the payment
of a prior judgment. The trial court concluded that the
assignment was valid and also that the plaintiff's cause
of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations and
accordingly entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, this court stated at pages 238-39:
Appellant contends tha the trial court erred in
one of its conclusions of law, "The claim of plaintiff herein was barred by sections 6607 and 6611,
Idaho Compiled Statutes 1919." The court does
not find as a fact that the action is barred by limitations, but does include the quotation above
in the conclusions of law. It con make no differ-
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ence in the instant case whether the court was
right or wrong in this conclusion, because since
the assignments are valid the judgment must be
affirmed regardless of the view that may be taken
upon the question of limitations. (Emphasis
added.)
In Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Co., 7 Utah 2d 293, 323
P. 2d 712 (1958), the plaintiff brought suit alleging fraud
by the defendants in inducing the plaintiff to enter into
certain transactions and for breach of contract. The trial
court found in favor of the plaintiff on both issues and
gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the trial court was in error as
to the issue of fraud. However, the judgment was affirmed
on the basis that the trial court's detennination of breach
of contract was correct. The court, at page 298, stated:
We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed based upon the precept that the judgment should be sustained if the findings support
it on any correct legal theory.
In Conclusions of Law 1, 2 and 3, the trial court concluded that there was no duty owed to McKee by GSL
relative to the performance bond, no breach of any duty
and no casual relationship to any damage which GSL
may have sustained. Each of these conclusions of law
are supported by the findings of fact and each independent of the other would sustained the judgment entered
in favor of the defendant.

A. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION
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OF LAW THAT GSL IS BARRED BY
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS
CORRECT.
Conclusion of Law No. 5 states:
5. Any damage which the plaintiff, GSL, suffered by the failure of Houben to procure the
performance bond was the direct and proximate
result of the plaintiff's own negligence (R. 92).
The plaintiff argues that contributory negligence does
not bar its recovery under its first cause of action for
breach of contract. The only authority which the plaintiff cites for this proposition is a statement from Williston,
On Contracts, § 1012 C, at pages 40-41, the pertinent part
of which is:
The employee is nonetheless liable though the
principal was negligent, for the basis of liability
is not tort but contract, and the employer is under no duty to the employee to be careful about
his own affairs. (Emphasis added.)
An examination of the foregoing text of Williston
indicates that the only case authority which he cites for
the foregoing proposition are two English cases. Williston cites the case of Becker v. Medd, 13 TL Rep. 313,
decided in 1897, and the case of Vail Brothers v. Hobsony
149 LT Rep. 283 (KB), decided in 1933. Although the
foregoing statement may have been the law in England
in 1933, it has not been adopted by jurisdictions in the
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United States. The Restatement of Agency 2d, § 415,
states:
Principal's Contributory Fault as Defense. The
liability of the agent to the principal can be
avoided, terminated, or reduced by a breach of
contract by the principal, his contributory fault,
or his failure to mitigate damages. (Emphasis
added.)
The very authority upon which the plaintiff relies to
establish the duty of an agent who undertakes to procure
insurance for his principal recognizes the defense of
contributory negligence. The plaintiff, at pages 21-22 in
its brief, from 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 175 states
as follows:
Where the agent fails to procure insurance in accordance with his instructions* the person employing him for that purpose is not contributory
negligent because of not seeking to obtain insurance through other means where he has not
been notified that a policy of insurance has not
been issued. (Emphasis added.)
Any duty or obligation on the part of McKee relative to seeing that Houben was bonded, arose by virtue
of the principal-agent relationship between the parties.
The plaintiff admits that this duty, if it existed, was implied. The plaintiff, at page 19 of its brief, states "a
promise on McKee's part to see to the bonding of Houben
must be implied."
In the case of Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc. v. Lea,
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401 F. 2d 650 (C. A. 3rd, 1968), the court stated at page
656 the corresponding duties of principal and agent:
An insurance broker is under a duty to exercise
the care that a reasonably prudent businessman
in the brokerage field would exerdse under similar circumstances and if the broker fails to exercise such care and if such care is the direct
cause of loss to his customer, then he is liable
for such loss unless the customer is also guilty
of failure to exercise care of a reasonably prudent businessman for the protection of his own
property and business which contributes to the
happening of such loss. (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Adkins & Ainley, Inc. v. Busaday 270
A. 2d 135 (D. C. Ct. of App., 1970), the court stated at
page 137:
It is true that in the first transaction the broker
has a duty to inform the insured of cancellation, however, he is legally relieved of that duty
if it can be sfiown that the insured knew or
should have known of the cancellation from other
sources. (Emphasis added.)
Where a person knows or reasonably should know
that his insurance agent has not procured requested insurance, he has a corresponding duty not to be contributorily negligent or, in other words, to use reasonable care
to protect his property interests.
The trial court found as a fact that GSL continually,
from August 21, 1969, the date the letter of intent was
issued to Houben, knew that Houben was not bonded,
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and nevertheless it allowed Houben to continue on the
project and continued to pay monthly progress billings.
(Finding of Fact No. 8, R. 90). The court also found
that GSL had the right to terminate Houben for its failure to provide the bond and to retain all monies due
Houben. (Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 89.) This Finding
of Fact was not challenged by the plaintiff.
Certainly the foregoing Findings of Fact support the
court's Conclusion of Law that "any damage which the
plaintiff, GSL, suffered by the failure of Houben to procure the performance bond was the direct and proximate
result of the plaintiff's own negligence" (R. 92).
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION
OF LAW THAT GSL HAD WAIVED ITS
RIGHTS AGAINST McKEE AND WAS
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT SUCH RIGHTS
WAS CORRECT.
Conclusion of Law No. 6 states:
Any duty or obligation of the defendant, McKee,
relative to the Houben performance bond or any
rights arising from any breach or damage thereof
was waived by the plaintiff, GSL, and the plaintiff is estopped to assent such rights or the breach
thereof against the defendant, McKee (R. 92).
This court has defined waiver in the case of Woolley
v. Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 Pac. 908 (1920), at pages 34748:
Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relin-
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quisihment of a known legal right and implies an
election to dispense with something of value or
forego some advantage which the party waiving might, at his option, have demanded or insisted upon.
*

*

*

It must be made to appear that the defendant
waived the right either in express terms or by
showing such facts and circumstances from which
the intention to waive may be clearly inferred
or implied. (Emphasis added.)
The principle of waiver has been applied to the contractual requirements of performance bonds.
In Lesser v. William Holiday Cord Associates, Inc.,
349 F. 2d 490 (C. A. 8th, 1965), the court held at page
493:
The subcontract, as has been noted, provided
that Atlas at its expense should provide the performance and payment bond by September 22,
1959. A requirement of this kind, in a construction contract may, of course, be waived. (Citations omitted.) We feel, as did the trial court,
that by permitting Atlas to come upon the jobsite after September 22 without the submission
of the performance and payment bond, D & L
waived the subcontract's requirement that the
bond be furnished.
See also, Hevenor v. Union Railroad Co. of New York
City, 198 N. Y. S. 409, 410 (1923).
In plaintiff's brief, at pages 26 and 27, it argues that
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the waiver of a contractual right requires consideration.
In support of this contention, the plaintiff cites the Utah
case of Schwab Safe & Lock Co. v. Snow, 47 Utah 199,
152 Pac. 171 (1915). The defendant submits that the
plaintiff in its brief has misinterpreted the holding of the
Schwab case. In that case, the defendant counterclaimed
for damages arising out of the failure of the plaintiff
to deliver certain safes which the defendant had ordered
from the plaintiff. With respect to the order of one W. H.
Bishop, the court held that the defendant had waived
his right to recover damages for the breach of this order
because the defendant's proposal to cancel the order had
been accepted by the plaintiff. The court stated at pages
202 and 211:
The defendant, however, proposed an unconditional cancellation of the order, and the plaintiff
accepted the proposition . . . acceptance by plaintiff of defendant's proposal to cancel or rescind
the order was a sufficient consideration to support such rescission or cancellation. (Emphasis
added.)
*

*

*

But what is a "waiver"? It is defined as being
the volutary and intentional relinquishment of
a known legal right and implies an election to
dispense with something of value or forego some
advantage which the party waiving it might, at
his option, have demanded or insisted upon. 4
Words and Phrases (2d Ser.) 1226,1227.
A waiver may or may not rest in contract. If it
does, it, like all other contracts, requires some
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consideration. It may, however, also partake of
the nature of an estoppel in pais.
The court held in the Schwab case that a waiver of
a contractual right or a breach of contract may be made
by mutual consent or contract, and if it is, then consideration is necessaiy. However, the court also stated
that waiver may also be based on the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known legal right in the
nature of an estoppel in pais.2
The subsequent Utah cases which have considered
waiver have not referred to any requirement of consideration. The case of Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath,
90 Utah 187, 61 P. 2d 308 (1936), involved the issue as
to whether or not certain instructions by an insurance
company to its agent to reduce the coverage on a fire
policy had been waived. The case of American Savings
and Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 445
P. 2d 1 (1968), involved the issue of whether or not the
contractual right of the mortgagee to accelerate the debt
had been waived.
The case of Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah 465, 229
P. 2d 296 (1951), involved the validity of an assignment
of certain debts. The assignment to the plaintiff was
contingent upon the payment by the assignor to the assignee of $9,000. This $9,000 payment had not been
2

Estpppel in pais is "an estoppel not arising from deed or record or
written contract . . . The doctrine is that a person may be precluded
by his act or conduct or silence, when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right he would otherwise have had." Black's Law Dictionary,
(4th Ed.) p. 898.
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made. On this ground, the defendant claimed that the
assignment was invalid. The trial court concluded that
the plaintiff had waived this requirement. This court on
appeal stated at page 468:
As stated in 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 491, p. 933:
* * * a party to a contract, who is entitled
to demand performance of a condition precedent, may waive the same, either expressly or
by acts evidencing such intention. (Emphasis
added.)
In the foregoing Ahrendt case, there was no discussion that considerajtion was necessary to sustain the
waiver.
The requirement of the $300,000 performanice bond
by Houben and the requirement that it be provided without delay and any obligation on the part of McKee to
see that it was provided without delay were for the benefit of GSL, These rights,, of course, could be waived by
GSL. The court found that continuously from August
21, 1969, the date of the Houben letter of intent, GSL
knew that no performance bond had been provided; nevertheless, it continued to allow Houben to continue with
the conveyor project and continued to make monthly
progress payments. (Finding of Pact No. 8, R. 90,) The
court also found that GSL, as the principal and owner,
had the right at all times to terminate Houben because
of the failure to provide the performance bond, and upon
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such termination could have retained all payments which
were due to Houben. (Finding of Pact No. 7, R. 89.)
The court entered its conclusion of law that GSL had
waived any rights which it had against McKee relative
to seeing that the performance bond was provided. This
conclusion of law is clearly supported by the findings of
fact and is correct under the foregoing legal authority.
The court also concluded that GSL was estopped to
assert any claim against McKee arising out of Houben's
failure to procure the performance bond. In the case of
Cook v. Cook, et al., 110 Utah 406,174 P.2d 434 (1946),
the court at page 411 defined estoppel:
To constitute an estoppel there must be conduct
amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of material facts; these facts must be known
to the party sought to be estopped and unknown
at the party who claims the benefit of the
estoppel and who relying upon such conduct
acted upon it to his loss.
The doctrine of estoppel by silence was recognized
by this court in the case of Utah State Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140
P.2d 763 (1943). The Utah Supreme Court stated at
pages 29-30:
It is almost unnecessary to add that mere inaction
or silence may, under peculiar circumstances,
amount to both misrepresentation and concealment which may amount to an estoppel...
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It is generally held that in order for silence to
work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty to
speak or there must be something willful or culpable in the silence which allows another to place
himself in an unfavorable position by reason
thereof.
It is clear that a principal has a duty to inform his
agent of any risks which are unknown to the agent and
Which if unknown would subject the agent to pecuniary
loss. See Restatement of Agency, 2d § 435.
In Lawrence Warehouse Company v. Twohig, 224 F.2d
493 (C.A. 8th, 1955), the court stated at page 497:
. . . A principal has the obligation of exercising
good faith toward his agent in the incidents of
their relationship. He is subject to the responsibility in favor of the agent of using care to prevent harm coming to the agent in the prosecution of the enterprise, 'and this extends in general to his disclosing facts which, if unknown,
would be likely to subject the agent to pecuniary
loss.9 (Emphasis added)
If GSL as principal was relying on McKee to see that
Houben secured the performance bond and would attempt
to hold McKee responsible in the event that the bond was
not procured, GSL had a duty to advise McKee of any
information which came to its attention relative to Houben's ability to secure the performance bond.
The court found that on November 14, 1969, GSL
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
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known, that Houben was in serious financial difficulty
and probably would not have been able at that time to
secure the required performance bond. (R. 90) The court
also found that GSL did not advise McKee of the information and knowledge which GSL had concerning Houban's financial difficulties. (R. 90) The court concluded
in Conclusion of Law No. 4, that GSL had breached its
duty to inform McKee in this regard. (R. 92) In Finding
of Fact No. 7, the court found that GSL had the right to
terminate Houben for its failure to procure the performance bond and retain all monies due. (R. 89)
GSL had a duty to advise McKee of Houben's financial difficulties of which it knew on November 14,
1969. The failure to do so placed McKee in the "unfavorable position" of potential loss by GSL's failure to inform
McKee of Houben's financial difficulties and its failure
to terminate Houben. The court properly concluded that
GSL's failure in this regard estops it from asserting any
action against McKee arising out of Houben's failure to
provide the performance bond.
CONCLUSION
As indicated herein, the findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence. The evidence is contrary to plaintiff's requested findings of fact and certainly is not "such
that all reasonable men would conclude" that its requested findings are correct. The conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact and are correct under the ap-
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plicable legal authorities. The judgment entered in favor
of the defendant, Arthur G. McKee & Company, should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MERLIN 0. BAKER
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake Sity, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, MERLIN O. BAKER, hereby certify that I served
two copies of the Brief of Defendant-Respondent, Arthur
G. McKee & Company upon Claron C. Spencer, Attorney
for Plaintiff-Appellant, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City,
Utah, by mailing two copies of said Brief to him at his
office this 7th day of April, 1975.

Merlin O. Baker

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY]
DEC 6

1975

BRfG.'IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Clark Law School

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

